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' PREFACE 
This publication, "Failure Mechanisms of Monolithic Microcircuits, is Volume 
2 of a four-volume  series  entitled,  "Monolithic  Microcircuits  Reliability Handbook. I '  
The Handbook was  prepared  for  the  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration by 
Texas Instruments Incorporated, under Contract NAS 8-20639. The Handbook series 
consists of the  following  volumes: 
Volume 1 Application of Monolithic Microcircuits 
Volume 2 Failure Mechanisms of Monolithic Microcircuits 
Volume 3 Failure Analysis of Monolithic Microcircuits 
Volume 4 Reliability Assessment of Monolithic Microcircuits 
The  purpose of the Handbook is to  provide  aid i n  determining  the  most  effective 
application  and  understanding of monolithic  microcircuits, and  the  most  effective 
quality  and  reliability  assurance  controls  for  the  circuits. 
Volume 2 ,  "Failure Mechanisms of Monolithic Microcircuits, describes: 
Failure  modes  and  mechanisms. 
0 The severity of the principal failure modes and mechanisms. 
0 A comparative evaluation of the frequency of occurrence of the principal 
failure  modes and mechanisms. 
The failure modes and mechanisms associated with: 
0 Packaging 
0 Mounting of semiconductor  chip  or  die. 
0 Metallization  and  interconnection  system. 
0 Mask  lignment. 
0 Silicon  dioxide  fects. 
0 Diffusion. 
0 Electrical  isolation  and  interaction  between  the  various 
elements of the  chip. 
Definition and identification of a type of control, inspection or   screening 
test  that is effective  in  detecting,  for  screening  purposes,  each of the 
principal  failure  modes  and  mechanisms. 
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VOLUME 2 
FAILURE MECHANISMS IN MONOLITHIC MICROCIRCUITS 
SECTION  I 
INTRODUCTION 
A.  GENERAL 
This  volume of the  Reliability Handbook discusses  defects  that  are  introduced 
into  monolithic  microcircuits  during  the  various  processes of manufacture,  the 
impact of these  defects on microcircuit  failure  rates,  and  the  techniques  that  are  used 
to correct  or  remove  the  defects  from  the  processes.  The  techniques of processing 
that a r e  used in the  manufacture of monolithic  microcircuits  are  sophisticated, 
numerous and complex. There is a finite probability that defects are introduced at each 
each  step of the  manufacturing  process.  These  defects  are of concern  to  both  the 
manufacture  and  the  user of monolithic  microcircuits in  two major  respects:  
e Defects  reduce  the  effective  yield of the  manufacturer,  thereby 
e Defects  may  cause  microcircuit  reliability  problems which adversely 
increasing  the  cost of each  microcircuit bought by the  user. 
affect  the  user's end  product  and  the  reputation of the  microcircuit 
manufacturer. 
It is essential,  therefore,  that  defects  be  identified  and  that  corrective  actions and 
screening  procedures be implemented to minimize  the  effect of imperfect  processes. 
Every manufacturing process produces varied results. The effect of variations 
within  a  given process is that  the  distribution of pieces  will  range  from  nearly  perfect 
to  totally  unacceptable.  The  manufacturer  must  determine  what  degree of imperfection 
will  affect  the  acceptability  or  reliability of his microcircuit. When this  degree of 
imperfection  is  determined,  his  defect  criteria is set .  If the standard is set  too high, 
acceptable  parts  are  rejected and microcircuit  cost is increased. If the  cri teria is 
set  too low, defective parts are  accepted and the  microcircuit  cost  is  increased. In 
the  latter  case,  acceptable  parts  are  sometimes  manufactured  which  fail i n  system 
application  at  some  later  date;  these  are  reliability  failures. 
The  random  distribution of par ts  which  may  occur  within a given process is 
more  readily  divided  into  three  categories: 
0 White.  These  pieces  are  totally  acceptable and cause no problems 
e Gray. It is not  known whether  these  pieces  are good o r  bad. They 
with subsequent  process  yields  or  device  reliability. 
may  fall  out in later  processing o r  be  screenable  from  end  products 
i f  bad. They may also cause reliability failures. 
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e Black.  These  pieces are totally  unacceptable.  Further  processing 
would result   in  increased  microcircuit   cost   from  yield  loss.  
Most  reliability  failures  result  from  the  processing of rrgray''  category  devices.  These 
reliability  failures are usually  escapes  from a screening  process  that is designed  to 
remove  the  potentially  unreliable  pieces  from  the  lrgraylr  category. 
B. DE FINITIONS 
Sew  terms and  definitions are necessary  to  clarify  the  terminology  which  has 
arisen n.ith the  growth  in  manufacture  and  application of monolithic  microcircuits. 
,Although the terms Ifdefect, I '  "failure mode, and "failure mechanisms" are  common 
among  manufacturers  and  users of monolithci  microcircuits,  unfortunately,  these 
te rms  have different meanings to different people. Also, they are fairly broad in 
nature and do not define  exactly  the  information  which is of concern  to  the  manufacture 
and user  of  monolithic  microcircuits.  The  following  characterizations  cover  the  varied 
combinations of information which are frequently encountered under "defect, "failure 
modes. " and "failure  mechanisms, I '  and  they  provide  complete  and  consistent 
terminolog-: 
e Detector 
e Indicator 
e Ph>.sical  cause of failure 
e Design,  process,  or  application  cause of failure 
e Generator 
e P a r t   o r  area affected 
One or   more of the  first  three  characterizations is usually  included  under  the 
tern7 "Failure mode. " The  last  item  is  usually  associated  with  the  term  "defect, ' I  and 
the l a s t  three items are recognized as "failure mechanism" characterizations. The 
f r~ l lowi ing  definitions of these  items  more  clearly  identify  their  intended  usage: 
e Detector.  The  inspection  or  test  which  detected  failure.  The 
scope of the  inspection or   tes t   includes  user   re turns  and  field  failures, 
qualification tests, acceptance tests, pre-cap visual, etc. 
e Indicator.  The  parameter  that is out of l imit ,  or  fa i lure  of the part  
e Physical  cause of failure. A description of those  abnormal  physical 
to  meet  any  other  specified  requirement. 
conditions  and/or  characteristics of the  device  which  analysis  has 
disclosed as the  reason(s)  for  failure  to  meet  specified  require- 
ment(s). Examples a re  open ball bond, shorted metallization, 
sagging  lead  wires, etc. 
e Design,  process,  or  application  cause of failure.  That  which  must 
he  corrected  to  prevent  future  failures of the  same kind. It can be 
elements of workmanship, material, process design, process 
r;ontrol: device design, user application, etc. 
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NOTE 
It is necessary  to  distinguish  between  the  physical 
cause of failure  and its antecedent  cause  in  design, 
process, or application. Cause of failure is "that 
which  must  be  corrected, ' I  while  the  physical  cause 
is identified  by  the  information  disclosed  in  analysis. 
For  example,  contamination  on  the  bar  may  have 
caused  excessive  current  leakage;  however, con- 
tamination  was not the  antecedent  cause,  but 
rather  an  inadequate  wash  cycle. 
0 Generator.   The  material ,   operation,  inspection,  or  test   which 
generated the failure. Included in this meaning  are  test,  application, 
operation,  and  field  use. An inspection  or  test is a generator  only 
if the  part  was  damaged  during  that  inspection  or  test, o r  if  the 
par t  is an  escape  from  that  inspection or  test. 
0 Part  or  area  affected.  This  may  be  metallization,  lead  wire 
assembly, weld seam, oxide, bulk material, diffusion, etc. The 
correct  descriptive  terminology  locates  the  anomaly and establishes 
it as a "defect. Defects always have "failure mode" and "failure 
&echanism"  histories. 
The  aforemention&l  definitions are  particularly  essential  to  the  definition of 
the word "defect" and to its application. A resistor  whose  cross  sectional  area  has 
been  reduced  during  masking  and  diffusion  has no history  related  to  open  circuitry. 
It would serve no purpose  to  call  it  "defective" on the  basis of conjecture. 
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SECTION I1 
DEFECTS INTRODUCED BY MONOLITHIC MICROCIRCUIT PROCESSING 
A .  GENERAL 
Many process  operations  are  performed  sequentially  during  the  manufacture of 
monolithic  microcircuits.  These  operations  are  subdivisions of six  major  process  areas 
that are critical  to  the  manufacture of microcircuits.  These  critical  process  categories 
a r e  as follows: 
e Mask  and  etch 
e Diffusion 
0 Metal  v poration 
e Scribe  and break 
e Mount and bond 
e Packaging 
This  section  briefly  discusses  the  operations  within  each  major  process  category 
which  can  be  improperly  or  imperfectly  performed  to  cause a defect(s)  in  monolithic 
microcircuits. 
B. MASK A N D  ETCH A N D  RELATED  DEFECTS 
The  mask  and  etch  category  provides  the  technique by which  diffusions  and 
metallizations  are  applied  to a silicon slice to produce a microcircuit  chip.  The 
process  uses a pattern  mask  to  expose an etch  resist  material in some  particular 
geometric  pattern so that  silicon  dioxide o r  thin-film  metallization  may be preferentially 
etched  from  the  silicon  slice.  The  process  variables  can  be  evaluated  as  subcategories 
of mask, etch resist, and etch. 
1. Mask  Defects. 
There  are  four  major  defect  areas  associated  with  the  photolithographic 
mask. These defect areas are: 
e Light  areas  in  dark  regions. 
0 Dark  areas  in  transparent  regions. 
0 Poor  mask  definition. 
e Improper  pattern  dimensions. 
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The  causes  for  these  defect areas are factors of material,  handling,  cleanliness, 
equipment,  and  operator  error.  Regardless of the  cause  for  the  mask  defects,  only 
two process  defects  can  result  from  them.  These  process  defects are: 
0 Oxide or metal will be removed from areas where oxide o r  
metal  is required,   or ,  
0 Oxide or  metal  wil l  be left in areas where oxide o r  me ta l  is 
not  wanted. 
These two process  defects can  cause  many  different  monolithic-microcircuit  defects 
to exist. Some examples are: 
a Open metallization, 
0 Shorted  m tallization, 
0 Shorted or  degraded  junctions, 
0 Regions of high o r  low resistivity, 
a Poor  xide  integrity,  and, 
a Poor  ohmic  contact  between  silicon and metal. 
2. Etch  Resist  Material  Defects. 
The  etch resist operation  includes  the  application  alignment,  exposure, 
selective removal, and final removal of the  etch  resist  material.  The  defect areas 
which  can  occur  from  incorrect  or  imperfect  operations are: 
0 Impure  photoresist  material. 
0 Improper  application of photoresist  material. 
0 Poor  adhesion of photoresist  material. 
0 Improper  mask  alignment. 
0 Improper  exposure of photoresist  material. 
0 Improper  development of photoresist  material. 
0 Improper  emoval of photoresist  material. 
a Improper  handling of slices  during  the  photoresist  operation. 
The  causes  for  these  defect  areas a re  factors of material,  handling,  cleanliness, 
equipment, and opera tor   e r ror .  Only three  process  defects  can  result   from  the 
photoresist area: 
a Oxide or metal  will  be removed from areas w h e r e  oxide o r  
metal is required. 
e Oxide or metal will remain in areas where oxide or metal is 
not wanted, o r ,  
0 Etch resist material will be left on the slice, which could cause 
current  leakage  paths. 
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The  three  preceding  process  defects  can  cause  many  different  monolithic  microcircuit 
defects to exist. Some examples are: 
Open metallization. 
Shorted  'metallization. 
Shorted o r  degraded  junctions. 
Regions of high o r  low resistivity. 
Poor  xide  integrity. 
Poor  ohmic  ontact  between  silicon  and  metal. 
Parameter  degradation  from  contaminated  surfaces. 
3. Etch  Defects. 
The  etch  operation  consists of the  application of a silicon o r  metal  etch  to 
the  masked  slice  and  the  removal of the  etch by washing  the  slice.  Some  defect  areas 
in  processing  at  the  etch  operation  are: 
Improperly  mixed  tches. 
Improper  etch  time. 
Improper  rinsing of etch. 
Improper  handling of material  during  the  process  operation. 
These  defect  areas  are  caused by factors of material, handling, cleanliness, equip- 
ment, and operator error. There are only three process defects which can result from 
the etch operation. These defects are: 
Oxide or metal will be removed from areas where metal or 
Oxide or metal will be left in area where oxide or metal is not 
Etch  residues  will not be  removed  sufficiently  from  the  slice. 
oxide is required, 
wanted, o r ,  
Some  microcircuit  defects  which  are  attributable  to  the  etch  operation  are: 
Open metallization. 
Shorted  metallization. 
Shorted  or  degraded  junctions. 
Regions of high o r  low resistivity. 
Poor  oxide  integrity. 
Poor  ohmic  contact of metal  to  silicon. 
Parameter  degradation  from  contaminated  surfaces. 
Chemical  decomposition of materials  from  etch  residues. 
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C.  DIFFUSION AND RELATED  DEFECTS 
The  diffusion  process  provides  the  technique by which  components a r e  con- 
structed  within  the  monolithic  microcircuit  chip.  Defects  associated  with  this  process 
and  resultant  conditions a r e  as follows: 
e Flaws in the starting slice material can cause nonuniform diffusion 
depths. The diffusion depths can be so nonuniform  that  shorting of 
junctions or  complete  shorting of components can exist. Nonuniform 
junction  depth  can  also  cause  parameter  variations  within a micro- 
circuit ,  which results in improper circuit operation. Some examples 
of flaws  in  the  starting  material  are:  dislocations,  stacking  faults, 
crystal  misorientation  and  regions of high  dopant  densities. 
e Improper  resistivity of starting  material  can  cause  the  diffusion 
gradients to be wrong i n  each component. Improper diffusion 
gradient  can  cause  the  component's  parameters  to  be out-of- 
tolerance  with  respect  to  circuit  design  limits  and  can  result i n  
marginal  circuits  or  malfunctioning  circuits. 
e Improperly cleaned slices prior to diffusion can cause regions of 
spurious diffusion. The contaminant on an improperly cleaned 
slice  can  act   as a mask, which  impedes  the  diffusion  rate i n  the  area 
of contamination. Contaminants also impede the proper growth of 
oxide  during a diffusion  process,  thereby  causing  poor  oxide  inte- 
grity  to  exist   in. the  area of contamination. 
e Improper  deposition,  diffusion,  and  deglaze  rates  result i n  improper 
diffusion depths and/or improper impurity densities. These improper 
depositions  or  dopant  concentrations a r e  the  primary  cause of 
electrical  parameter  failures  such  as  gain,  breakdown  voltage, 
resistor values,  etc.  
e Improper handling during the diffusion cycle can cause bulk silicon 
damage  in  the  form of excessive  dislocation  densities  and  excessive 
lattice stains. These types of defects result from thermal and 
mechanical  shock,  and  they  change  the  silicon's  crystalline  structure, 
particularly at elevated temperatures. All the aforementioned 
defect   areas   are   the  resul t  of improperly  controlled  process  variables 
such as material, equipment, cleanliness, handling, and operator 
error. The microcircuit defects which result are usually functions 
of the  bulk  component  characteristics,  and  they  affect  the  electrical 
properties of the  circuit. 
D, METAL EVAPORATION A N D  RELATED  DEFECTS 
Metallization is the  technique by which the  components of a monolithic  micro- 
circuit  are  interconnected  to  form  the  complete  circuit.  The  process  consists of the 
combined operations of metal evaporation, metallization, pattern mask, and pattern 
etch.  Since  the  defects  associated  with  masking  and  etching  were  discussed  pre- 
viously,  only  those  defects  associated  with  evaporation  will  be  discussed  here. 
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Defects  can  be  introduced  at  the  metal  evaporation  operation by any  of  the  follow- 
ing  mechanisms: 
0 Improper  slice  leanliness 
0 Improper  evaporatiofi'equipment 
0 Improper  metal  purity  cpntrol 
0 Improperly  controlled  herational  procedures 
These  mechanisms by  which  defects are  introduced at the  metal  evaporation op'eration 
are functions of variables  in  material,  equipment,  cleanliness,  handling  and  operator 
e r r o r ,  
Some  microcircuit  defects  which are related  to  metal  evaporation  are: 
0 Insufficient thickness of metal to meet the circuit 's current design 
0 Poor ohmic  contact  to  the  silicon or silicon  dioxide. 
0 Improper  alloying of metals  into  silicon,  which  results  in  bulk 
0 Contaminated metal films which might bond poorly at the die-to- 
capabilities. 
material  degradation. 
package bond operation. 
E. SCRIBE AND BREAK AND RELATED  DEFECTS 
The  scribe  and  break  operation  performs  the  function of reducing  the  slice  into 
individual  microcircuit  wafers or  chips.  The  microcircuit  defects  which  are  intro- 
duced by the  scribe  and  break  operation  are  chips,  fractures  and  cracks.  The  process 
variables  which  induce  chips,  fractures, o r   c r acks   a r e   f ac to r s  of material,  handling, 
equipment,  procedures  and  operator  errors. 
The  scribe  and  break  operation is considered  critical  primarily  because of the 
significant  contribution  to  the  reliability  failure  rate  made by chips,  cracks,  and 
fractures.  The high incidence of these  defects  occurs  because  the  silicon  material 
is thin, brittle, and crystalline in composition. Any significant reduction in the 
reliability  failure rate of monolithic  microcircuits  must  include  the  reduction of 
cracks, chips, and fractures. 
F. MOUNT AND BOND  AND RELATED DEFECTS 
The  mount  and  bond  operation  provides  the  technique by which a microcircuit 
chip  can  be  used in electronic  equipment.  The  microcircuit  chip is too  fragile  and 
small  to  be  useful  in  electronic  equipment.  The  chip  must  therefore  be  properly 
packaged  to  become a useful  tool.  The  mount  operation  makes  the  microcircuit  chip 
stationary  in  the  package,  and  the bond operation  connects  the  active  component of the 
chip  to  the  leads of the  package. 
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1. Mount  Defects. 
Two  methods of mounting are popular in present  packaging  techniques. 
One method  uses  an  alloy  technique  with a metal  (usually  gold)  to  connect  the  chip  to 
the  package.  The  silicon wafer is in ohmic  contact  to its platform  which  may or  may 
not  be  isolated  from  the  package.  The  second  technique  uses a low-melting-point 
glass  to  connect  the  package  to  the  header.  The  two  techniques are commonly  refered 
to as alloy  mount  and  glass or ceramic  mount. 
The  defects  introduced  into  monolithic  microcircuits by the  mount  opera- 
tion a r e  functions of material equipment, cleanliness, equipments, procedural 
controls,  and  operator  error.  Some  examples of defects  which  can  be  caused by an 
improper  mounting  operation  are: 
0 Die  separation  from  header. 
0 Crack,  strains,   fractures.  
0 Scratched  metallization. 
0 Improper  lead  wire  routing. 
0 Improper  package  seal  from  mount  contaminants on 
header weld  flange. 
2. Bond Defects. 
The bond operation  uses  thermocompression  bonding tec,hniques to  con- 
nect  the  chip  to  the  package  with a small  w i r e .  Some  variations of thermocompres- 
sion  bonding  techniques are   bal l  o r  nailhead  bonds,  wedge  bonds,  stitch  bonds,  and 
ultrasonically  scrubbed  bonds. 
The  bonding  technique is perhaps  the  most  critical  with  respect  to  mono- 
lithic  microcircuit  failure  rates in that it is often  the  weakest  point  in  the  effort to 
achieve  true  microcircuit  performance  capability. 
The  defects which a r e  introduced by the  bonding  operation a r e  functions 
of material,  cleanliness,  equipment,  procedural  controls  and  operator  variables. 
Some  examples of defects  which a r e  introduced  into  microcircuits by the  bonding 
operator are: 
0 Broken wires. 
+ 0 Scratched  interconnects 
0 Chipped o r  fractured  dice. 
0 Weak  bonds. 
0 Undesirable  intermetallics  (commonly  called  plague), 
0 Sagging or  shorted wires. 
0 Improper  wire  routing. 
0 Improperly  placed  bonds. 
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G. Package  Seal  and  Related  Defects. 
The  final  operation in the  manufacture of monolithic  microcircuits is the 
sealing of the  package. Many different  packages,  packaging  materials  and  sealing 
methods are used. 
The  packaging  operation or the sealing operation  must  satisfy only  two require- 
ments: 
8 The chip and the interconnects to the package must be 
e The usefulness of the microcircuit as an electronic 
protected  from  external  environments. 
tool  must  not  be  affected. 
Any portion of the  sealing  operation  which  causes  either of these two require- 
ments  to  be  affected is considered a defect-introducing  operation.  Some  examples 
of defects  which  result  from  an  improper  sealing  operation are: 
e Inadequate  w ld seal. 
0 Inadequate  glass seal. 
e Particles  ealed  into  the  package,  and 
e Internal  damage  to  die,  interconnects, o r  header  from 
the  sealing  operation. 
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SECTION I11 
DISCUSSION O F  FAILURE MECHANISMS 
A. GENERAL 
A basic  ingredient of any  system  reliability  program is the  ability  to  analyze a 
system  monolithic  microcircuit  failure  and  determine  the  proper  course of action. 
This  action  may  vary  from  concluding  that  the  device is not a failure (i. e. , the  cause 
of failure is due  to  improper  system  application)  to  concluding  that  legitimate  micro- 
circuit  failures  which  require  manufacturer  corrective  action  have  occurred. 
Proper  determination of cause of failure is paramount. For this reason, an 
entire  volume of this Handbook is devoted  to  failure  analysis.  The  proper  direction of 
investigation  one  should  pursue  in  failure  analysis  is not  always  obvious  from  the 
failure  indication.  Often  times, a cursory  analysis  will  actually  uncover  the  cause of 
failure. However, too many times, what may appear to be a workmanship problem by 
cursory  analysis,  may  actually  be  unrelated  to  the  real  cause of failure. 
Consequently,  the  failure  mechanisms  discussed  in this section  can  be  viewed 
from two standpoints. First, the discussion can be used to understand all observed 
deficiencies  with  respect  to  manufacturing  processes.  Secondly,  and  most  important, 
if the  failure  mechanism is the  actual  failure  cause, the discussion  can  be a start ing 
point  for  determination of proper  corrective  action. 
B.  PROBABILITY  OF  ESCAPE OF DEFECTIVE DEVICE FROM MANUFACTURER 
One method of determining  the  importance of lu~own failure  mechanisms  is  to 
compare  the  probability of escape  from  the  manufacturer of devices  with  and  without 
postprocess  screening  techniques. Such an estimate would be pessimistic  with  re- 
spect  to  unscreened  devices,  since  the  implemented  screens  are  always in excess of 
use  condition  requirements. 
The  probability of escape by percentage  for  each  mechanism of failure  discussed 
herein  represents  the  total  percentage of defective  devices  shipped  by  the  manufactur- 
er of monolithic microcircuits. These percentages are shown in Table 1. The escape 
rate includes  those  parts  which  will  be  rejected by  the user's incoming  inspection, 
board  check  out,  system  acceptance test in  user's  house  and  user's  reliability 
failures. 
It is interesting  to  note  that  the  no-screen  devices  show a total  escape rate that 
is just  below  the  one  percent  acceptable  quality  level  (AQL),  which is a standard ac- 
ceptance  level  for "off the  shelf"  parts.  Extensive  screening  processes  improve  the 
acceptable  quality  level  by  approximately  one  order of magnitude,  and  they  allow con- 
sistant  acceptance of 0 . 1  percent AQL lots. 
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Table 1. Probability of Escape With and Without Post-Process Screening Techniques 
~- 
Failure  Mechanism 
KMER, photolithographic and 
diffusion  defects 
Oxide  defects 
Metallization  defects 
Mechanical  defects  in  the  die 
Parasitics, isolation 
Mounting of the  die  elements 
Die-to-package connections 
Package  integrity 
Total 
- 
1 
~ .. 
Probability of Escape* 
No 
Screening 
(%) 
. .  ~" - ~. 
0.04  
0 .17  
0.03 
0 . 0 9  
0 . 0 0  
0 .01  
0.10 
0 .50  
0.94 
~. .~ 
With 
Screening 
(%) 
." 
0.002 
0.030 
0 .004  
0 .000  
0 .020  
0.002 
0 .010  
0.012 
___- 
0 .080  
. -~ ." 
*The  probability of escape  estimated  here  represents  the  combined 
total of defective devices shipped by the manufacturer. This escape 
rate includes  those  parts which  will  be  rejected  by  the  user's  incoming 
inspection,  board  check  out,  system  acceptance  test  in  user's  house, 
and  user's  reliability failures. The  numbers  included  here  are not 
intended  to  be  guarantees, but they a r e  intended  to  give  guidance as to 
the  relative  magnitudes of the  various  failure  mechanisms. 
The breakdown of escapes  by  percentage, which constitutes  the  reliability 
failure rate, is shown in Table 2.  This breakdown represents the most recent 
information  available  from  life  test  programs  performed by  the  manufacturers 
and  users of monolithic  microcircuits. 
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Table 2. Contribution to Reliability Failure Rate by Failure Mechanism* 
~" . ~ ~~~ ~ 
Failure  Mechanism 
~ ~ -~ ~~~ ". 
KMER, photolithographic  and  diffusion  defects 
Oxide  defects 
Metallization  defects 
Mechanical  defects  in  the  die 
Mounting of the  die  elements 
Die-to-package connections 
Package  integrity 
Marginal 
Undetermined 
Contribution 
(c/o) 
4.6  
16. 0 
10 .5  - 
8. G 
10.5  
21.3 
14.9 
5.5  
8 . 1  
100 .0  
*These  percentages  represent  the  composite  total of failures from 
operating  and  storage  life  tests  which  determined  the  reliability 
failure rate   for  all monolithic  microcircuits. 
C.  IMPACT O F  PROCESS DEFECTS ON FAILURE  OCCURRENCE 
1. General 
A discussion of known failure  mechanisms  is   presented  here.   These 
failure  mechanisms  have  been  observed  in  finished  devices,  in  environmental  screens, 
and in application. The discussion of the  various  failure  mechanisms  contains  esti- 
mates  based on both fact  and  opinion of the  probability of failure  occurrence. 
2.  PhotolithonraDhic  and  Diffusion  Defects 
The  category of photolithographic  and  diffusion  defects  includes  faulty 
alignment  between  one o r   m o r e  of the  successive  mask  locations,  and  defects  in  the 
photolithographic  mask itself. The  mask  defect  may  be  one of definition,  intensity o r  
flaws which result  in dark  spots  in  the  clear areas of the  mask, as well as clear spots 
in an area which  by  design  should  not  transmit  light.  These  defects result in  improper 
photoresist  exposure  in  the area of the  mask  defect  which, after development,  will 
result  in improper  oxide  removal o r  improper diffusion. 
2-111-3 
A significant  number of defects of this type should  not  be  encountered by 
the user. This failure mechanism, when observed, is clearly an escape from electri- 
cal  testing.  This  defect is observable  in  the  silicon slice form  and  the  silicon slice 
electrical  probe test as well as final electrical tests. 
Failures  attributed  to  diffusion,  photoresist o r  photolithographic  mask 
defects  have  been  observed after a burn-in  screen.  The  magnitude of incidence of 
burn-in  failures  attributed  to  this  failure  mode is less than 0.  04 percent.  This  value 
is  known to  be  pessimistic,  since  the  finest  failure  mode  breakdown of burn-in  failures 
includes this mode in "other" die defects. These defects are those  remaining after 
the bulk of the  failures  in  the  more  general  category of die  defects  have  been individ- 
ually  itemized.  This figure is the  best estimate of the  incidence a user  of nonburn-in 
devices should expect to see. Devices which have survived burn-in and the associated 
redundant  testing  will  have a lesser probability of escape - estimated  to  be less than 
0 . 0 0 2  percent. 
3 .  Oxide Defects 
The  oxide-defects  mechanism  pertains to defects  in  the  surface  passiva- 
tion  oxide layer  that  provides  the  dielectric  between  the  die's  surface  and  the evapo- 
rated lead pattern. Gross defects in,  or removal of,  this dielectric prior to lead 
application  result  in  nonfunctional  'lshorted"  devices  with a probability of escape  (from 
screening) to the  customer so remote  that  discussion  here is not  warranted.  This, 
hon-ever, is not the case for the "pinhole. Pinhole is the name commonly ap- 
plied to small  localized  areas in the oxide layer with low dielectric  strength.  The 
more obvious causes  for  this  defect  include  the  presence of dust  particles,  minute 
photolithographic mask  flaws and contamination. It is generally  agreed  that  complete 
correction of these  and  other  apparent  pinhole  sources  will  not  resolve  the  total pin- 
hole problem. 
Complete  understanding of the  oxide-defect  failure  mode  can  occur  only 
after  successful  completion of  fundamental  research  on  silicon  surface  passivation. 
At the present  state of the  art,  the  oxide  layer is not completely  uniform. I t  contains 
areas  of greater and lesser dielectric  strength. When an area of low dielectric 
strength  occurs  under  the  lead  pattern a device  will  be  produced  that is shorted,  has 
high leakage, o r  has  reduced  resistance  to  electrical  overstress. 
The  location of the pinhole on a b a r  is random  in  nature.  The sites which 
occur in  inactive areas and not under  the  lead  pattern are of no consequence.  They 
cannot  contribute  to  device  failure. 
Reduction  in  the  incidence of this  failure  mode  has  been  accomplished by 
the  use of two coats and two exposures of the  photoresist,  using two different  masks. 
This  process  minimizes  pinholes  resulting  from  mask  flaws,  because  probability of 
alignment of minute  flaws  on two different  masks is remote.  Further  impact on pin- 
holes  may  be  gained by the  application of supplemental  additional  oxide o r  other  oxide 
layers  over  the  thermally grown oxide. These efforts fall into  the  category of "cor- 
rective action" by covering  the  inherent  defect  in  the  dielectric.  This  failure  mechan- 
ism  can  also  be  reduced by overvoltage  screens. 
Significant  quantities of products  with  double  coat,  double  exposure  and 
addition of supplemental  oxides,  have  been  processed  through  burn-in  screen.  The 
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incidence of burn-in  failures  attributed  to  oxide  defects is 0.17 percent.  Devices with 
the  double  coat,  double  expose  process  but  without  the  addition of a final  supplementary 
oxide,  that  have  been  processed  through  burn-in,  show a 0 . 3 2  percent  incidence of fail- 
ure  due  to  oxide  defects.  The  majority of the  defect  sites were located  where  the 
maximum  voltage  on  the  die was available  across  the site. It is apparent  that  when a 
voltage is applied  to a device  that is in  excess of any  voltage  the  device  has  previously 
seen,  breakdown of the  dielectric  can  occur,  since  breakdown will  occur  when  the 
applied  voltage is in  excess of the  dielectric  strength of the  weakest  point  in  the  oxide 
layer.  The  overvoltage  application  can  be  either  sustained o r  transient in nature. 
When the  applied  voltage is sustained  and  the  current  source is sufficiently  high, 
localized  heating  will  occur  in  the area of the  breakdown. In this  instance  evidence of 
overheating, lead melting, and discoloration will be observable on the die. Such a 
failure  should  be  attributed  to  electrical  overstress  rather  than  an  oxide  defect. If 
the e lectr ical   overst ress  is of short  duration  and  transient in nature  or  the  current 
source is limited, evidence of overstress  on the  bar will not  be  observable.  This will 
be particularly  true if the  lead  metallization  system is not  the  weakest  link in the 
circuit  chain. 
It is believed  that  many of the failures attributed  to  oxide  defects  are  in 
fact a result  of system  transients.  This  however  does  not  relieve  the  vendor of his  
responsibility  for  supplying  parts with reasonable  tolerance to overstress .  The pin- 
hole  failure is one of the  more  severe  problems  encountered in system  level  failures. 
Probability of escape of devices with insipient  oxide  defects is estimated  to  be 0 .03  
percent  for  100-percent  burned-in  devices. 
4. Metallization  Defects -___ 
Metallization defects include surface flaws, faulty evaporation, chemical 
reaction, gold migration  from  excess  heat,  3gtc-d  smeared  lead  patterns 
(where  opens o r  shorts  result),  insufficient  lead  thickness, and insufficient lead 
clearance.  Comments in the introduction to this  section  concerning  determination of 
the  real  problem  are  particularly  pertinent  to  this  mechanism. With sufficient magni- 
fication,  minor  discrepancies  will be observable in  the  lead  pattern of most  devices. 
These "cosmetics" should not be confused with actual cause of failure.  Overdesign of 
the  lead  pattern is usually  such  that  less  than 10 percent of the  design  lead width is 
sufficient  to  carry  rated  current  for  the  device.  This  fact  not  withstanding, a common 
criteria  for  visual  acceptance of the  bar  prior to  sealing  requires half of the  lead  width 
to be continuous. A scratch o r  flaw  which  exposes  the  underlying  oxide  for  over 50 
percent of the  lead  width is considered  defective.  Smears in the metallization  which 
do not short  to the  adjacent  lead are considered  acceptable at visual  inspection  except 
on  high  reliability  programs.  Criteria  for  acceptance on these  programs  usually 
require  isolation of adjacent  leads  to  be at least  50 percent of the  design  width of the 
clearance  between  leads. 
Significant  metallization  defects  which  result in device  failure  should  not 
be encountered by the  user.  Such a failure would  be  an  escape  from both pre-cap 
visual  inspection  and  final  electrical test. Comments contained in the previous section 
with  respect  to  tolerance  to  overstress of oxide  defects are also  applicable  to  lead 
metallization. If the  cross  section of a lead  pattern is materially  reduced, this loca- 
tion will be  weakened  with  respect  to  current  carrying  capacity. When an  overstress 
is applied  to  this  lead, this weakest  point  will  be  the first to  open.  Melting will  
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usually  occur,  and  evidence of lead  damage  prior  to  overstress  will   remain.   The 
melting  in  such a case is not  necessary,  but i f  present  it is usually  evidence of over- 
stress. 
Device  failures  from  burn-in  that are attributable  to  metallization  defects 
have  been  observed. All  metallization  defects  combined  account  for 0 .03 percent  loss 
vices  should  expect  to  encounter.  Devices  which  have  survived  burn-in  and  the 
associated  redundant  testing  will  contain  significantly  lower  metallization  escapes, 
3,4000 a t .  This is a reasonable estimate of the incidence a user  of n o n b u r c x d e -  
%o4O" estimated to be less than 0.004 percent. 
5. Mechanical  Defects  in  the  Die 
The  failure  mechanism of mechanical  defects  in  the  die  includes  bulk  de- 
fects in the silicon, and cracks, chips and fractures in the die. This failure mechan- 
ism is considered to be a significant  infant  failure  problem.  Cracks  are  intentionally 
induced  in  the  silicon  slice  scribing  operation of the  die  separation  process.  Every 
force,  bending  moment,  or  torque  applied to the  die  from  that  point  forward  could 
result  in a cracked  die  failure. 
The  manufacturer  quickly  learns  to  avoid  bending  or  torqueing  the  brittle 
silicon. In the hands of an uninitiated user this may not be the case. The finished 
flat  pack  device  looks  and  feels  like  a  solid  block  to  which  relatively  fragile  leads  are 
attached. This is deceiving. The silicon die is rigidly attached to the base plate of 
the  header.  Every  torque  or  bending  moment  applied  to  the  case will be  transmitted 
to  the  die.  Sufficient  force on the  case  to  crack  the  die  or  propogate an existing  crack 
may  occur at device  testing  and  board  mount. In the  event  that  the  board is assembled 
such  that  the  device body is rigidly  attached  to a printed  circuit  board,  bending 
moments  applied  to  the  board will be  transmitted  to  the  silicon.  Cracks will be en- 
countered at board  removal  and at device  decanning  during  the  analysis of the  failure. 
z o p e r  device.Lonr1ling m o t  be ~ O D  highly - P m y h s i z e ~ ~ a g t  to d i ec racks .  
Items  under  control  by  the  manufacturer  which  will  impact  cracked  dice 
include a mounting  method  that  insures  bar  support  under  the  bonding  pads  without 
excessive  build up of mount  material  around  the  edge of the  bar.  In the  event  the  die 
is cantilevered  and a bonding  pad is on  the  unsupported  area,  the  die is more  suscept- 
ible  to  cracks  induced  by  the  bonding  operation.  Introduction of stronger  packages is 
expected  to  significantly  reduce  the  occurrence of die  cracks. 
Attempts  to  induce  cracks  with  environmental stresses of thermal and 
mechanical shock, vibration, acceleration, temperature cycling and nondestructive 
electrical  pulses  have  been  relatively  unsuccessful.  Cracks  associated with electrical 
overstress  have  been  observed.  The  incidence of cracks  has  been  observed  to  be 
greater  on  devices  which  contain  excess  mounting  material  such  that  the  edges  and 
corners  of the  die are below  the  surface of the  mounting  materials. 
The  incidence of cracked  die  failures  from  burn-in  screen is 0 . 0 9  percent. 
This is a reasonable  estimate of the  incidence a user  of nonburn-in  devices  should  ex- 
pect  to  see;  however,  the  percentage  could  be  larger  or  smaller,  depending  on  the 
particular. packaging technique that is used.  This  mode is second  only  to  pin  holes  in 
severity at board test and  system  level  failures.  The  estimated  rate of incidence  the 
user  of devices  which  have  survived  environmental  screens  should  expect  to  see is 
0.02  percent. 
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6. Isolation of Parasi t ics  
The  presence o r  absenceaof  undesirable  and  destructive  parasitics is a 
function of device design. All monolithic microcircuits (especially junction-isolated) 
will  contain  parasitics by virtue of the  fact  that  multiple  elements are built on the 
same  silicon  die. 
Most  parasitics are undesirable;  'device  performance  can be degraded by 
their   presence.   Destructive  parasit ics  are  normally  observed in application, when 
supply  voltages a r e  applied to a device  in a sequence which the  device  has not previously 
seen.  Normally,  device  testing is accomplished by simultaneous  application of all sup- 
ply voltages.  Requirements  for  power  supply  sequencing  have  been  imposed on some 
devices  that  were  susceptible  to  destructive  parasitics.  These tests are composed of 
sequential  applications of all conceivable  combinations of supply  voltages  to  which  the 
device could be subjected  in its application.  Devices  capable of surviving  such a test  
may be assunled  to  be  free  from  damaging  parasitics as long as these  devices  are not 
subjected to overstress  conditions. It is always possible to damage devices by sub- 
jecting them to electr ical   s t resses  that a r e  beyond their  rated  limits.  Parasitics are 
known to  have  been  induced by overstress  conditions. 
Care  is  required  in  properly  identifying  the  parasitics which cause a fail- 
ure.  Visual  evidence of damage on the  die  surface of a device  that has failed clue to 
parasitic  transistor  action  can be identical to the  damage  observed on a device  de- 
stroyed by electr ical   overst ress .  When a particular  pattern of lead  melting  is 
observed to be repetitious, both a search  for  overstress  conditions and an analysis 
for  parasitics  should  be  initiated. 'I'he ability  to  reproduce  the  particular  pattern of 
melting by use of rated  supply  voltage  greatly  facilitates  the  identification of the 
damaging  parasitic. 
The  "state of the art" for  monolithic  microcircuits  is  continually  heing 
improved in order to reduce the effects of parasitics.  The  more  recent  designs  are 
relatively  free of undesirable  parasitics.  The  newer  concept of dielectric isolation is 
a good example of improved technology. Monolithic microcricuits manufactured by the 
dielectric  isolation  method  are  particularly  impervious to parasitics,  since  they  re- 
place  one  parasitic  diode with an  oxide  interface. 
Unlike failure  mechanisms  previously  described,  the  mechanism of failure 
due  to  parasitics  is  device-type  oriented.  Failure  incidence is a function of system 
requirements that are  designed into  the  device.  The  presence of parasitic  failures in 
a system shoulcl be  considered a major  problem,  because  it  implies that there is cle- 
sign  incompatibility  between  the  monolithic  microcircuit  and the system. I n  most 
cases ,  a design  modification is required  in  one o r  the  other. One should not expect 
parasit ics to present a reliability  problem when design  compatibility  exists. When 
such  compatibility  does  not  exist, it will  be  revealed  in  system  test, if not before. 
Gross  estimates of the  anticipated  incidence a user  shoulcl expect to see in this  case 
are  meaningless.  
7. Mounting of Monolithic  Elements 
Two mounting methods for monolithic elements are widely used. One i s  
a frit mount  that  uses a low-melting-temperature  glass.  The  other  method uses a 
gold alloy  mount.  Either  method of mounting  may  include a ceramic  substrate for 
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case  isolation.  Mounting  requirements  include  proper  placement  in  the  header  cavity, 
orientation, clearance, support and integrity to withstand environmental stress. Im- 
proper  placement  can  result  in a die  short  to the  internal  header  lead o r  cause unde- 
s i rable  bond wire   dress .  
The  incidence of mount  failures  from  burn-in  screen is less than 0 . 0 1  
percent.  Failures  with  this  mode are escapes  from  both  postmount  and  pre-cap  visual 
inspections as well as environmental  screens of vibration,  centrifuge  and  temperature 
cycling.  This  failure  should  not  be  expected  to  be a major  system  level  problem. 
Probability of escape  from  these  screens is estimated  to  be  0.002  percent. 
8 Die-to-  Package  Connections 
Connection  between  the  die's  evaporated  bonding  pad and  the  package  lead 
is usually  accomplished by means of a gold  bonding wire  and a thermoconlpression 
ball bond to  the  bonding  pad,  and a sti tch,   smear,  o r  wedge bond to  the  internal  header 
lead.  Failure  modes  associated  with  this  assembly  process  include  open  circuits  re- 
sulting  from  broken  wires,  separation of the bond from  the  lead as a resul t  of improp- 
er bond placement,  improper  bonding  (temperature o r  pressure)  chemical  reaction 
and  intermetallic  degradation.  Short  circuits  are  observed  to  be a result  of improper 
lead  wire  routing,  sagging  wires  shorting  to  the  die  edge,  evaporated  lead, o r  the 
package.  The  reliability of this  total  process is extremely  dependent upon the bonding 
operator.  Failure  incidence is affected by bonding-operator training and controls as 
well as by  design  revisions  to  simplify  the  bonding  operation.  Reduction of failures 
resulting  from  improper bond placement  have  been  accomplished by redesign of bond- 
ing  pads  to  increase  the  pad area and  thus  increase  tolerance of bond location on the 
pad. 
The  impact of failures  resulting  from  improper  wire  dress  has  been  re- 
duced by the  introduction of new package  designs.  One  such flat pack  package  allows 
the  die's  surface  to  be  at a lower  level  than  the  internal  header  leads,  making  shorter 
and  tighter  wires  possible,  with  a  reduced  probability of improper  wire  dress.  
Screening procedures which use acceleration, vibration, isolation, and 
threshold  tests are effective  in  further  reducing  the  incidence of these  failure  mechan- 
isms. Failure attributed to die-to-package connections are observed in burn-in 
failures at a ra te  of 0 . 2 2  percent.  This  figure is pessimistic  in  that it does  not  ac- 
count  for  the  most  recent  improvements.  Failures  attributed  to  sagging  wires  short- 
ing  to  the  die's  edge  account  for 0 .14 percent of the  burn-in  failures  and  are  included 
in  the  previous  figure. A significant  reduction  in  this  failure  mode was accomplished 
with  the  introduction of an  improved  header, as previously  described. 
The  best  estimate of the  incidence a user  of nonburn-in  devices  should ex- 
pect  to  see is in  the  range of 0 .10  to 0.15 percent.  The  majority of devices  subjected 
to  these  failure  mechanisms  are  screened at pre-cap  visual  inspection  and  should  be 
considered escapes from this inspection. Experiments have been conducted to deter- 
mine  the  efficiency of pre-cap  visual  inspection.  Review of possible  improvements  to 
increase  this  inspection  efficiency are now under  consideration.  It is generally  agreed, 
however,  that a significant  effect on these  failure  mechanisms  will  result  from  process 
improvement  rather  than  inspection  improvement. 
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The  action a consumer  should  take  in  the  event  excessive  failures  attributed 
to faulty die-to-package connections are encountered, include: 
0 Review environmental screening tests for possible improvements or 
additions  to  afford a greater  probability of defect  removal. 
0 Review the qualification, training and certification the manufacturer 
requires  for  the bonding  operator o r  operation. 
Review device design to insure incorporation of "state of the art" 
design  for  materials,  package,  and  process. 
9. Package  Integrity 
Package  integrity  failures  consist of nonhermetic  seals,  terminal  fatigue, 
external surface contamination, marking and plating deterioration. Hermeticity is 
considered  to  be  the  most  significant  package  integrity  indicator.  Approximately 0.5 
percent of hermiticity-screened  devices  have  leak  rates  that  are in  excess of 5 x 10-7 
std. atm. cc/s. The hermeticity screens performed on these devices included en- 
vironmental screens of acceleration, vibration, temperature cycling, and burn-in, in  
addition  to  all  postseal  process  handling  and  testing. 
Experiments  have  been  conducted  to  evaluate  the  probability of escape 
from an hermeticity  screen. Of more  than l G ,  000 devices  that were subjected to 
redundant  mass  spectrometer  helium  leak  tests, 0 .  012 percent  were  disclosed  as 
failures on the second 100  percent  test.  This  is  considered to be within hermeticity 
test  equipment  capability  with  respect  to  repeatibility. 
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SECTION IV 
SCREENING PROCEDURES 
A.  GENERAL 
The  purpose of screening is to  select  those  devices  which  have  the  required 
characterist ics  for  an intended application. In a production run of monolithic micro- 
circuits  there  will  be a range  or  distribution of values  for  each  characteristic of the 
device.  The  desired  characteristic  may  be a quality of workmanship, physical 
dimension  or  electrical  property.  Screening  processes are  used to select  the  micro- 
circuits for which the desired characteristic meets specific requirements. Frequently 
this  screen  is   merely  the  reading of an  electrical   parameter  or  the  measurement of a 
physical dimension. However, the screening process may include environmental or 
electrical  stressing  that is designed to cause  failure of those  devices  that  cannot  with- 
stand a necessary stress. Again, this is a process of selection. Any processing, 
testing,  or  inspecting  which  selects  devices with desired  characterist ics is a scree,yng 
operation. 
The  term  "screen"  is a broad  term which  must  be  defined  for  each  application of 
the device involved. Commonly, the term "screening" is used to identify the additional 
inspection,  processing,  and  testing  that are necessary to select  microcircuits  for 
special  requirements  that are more  str ingent than  those  specified  in  the  manufacturer's 
data  sheet,   or to eliminate  microcircuits  that are potential  early  failures. 
"Early"  failures are those  which  occur  during  the  first  hours of operation.  The 
failure  rate  decreases  rapidly as  the  weak  devices fail and are  removed. 
Some early  failures  are  eliminated by mechanical  stresses  such as shock,  vibra- 
tion, centrifuge, and temperature cycling. Other early failures are eliminated by 
operating  burn-in,  where  the  devices are operated  at  higher  loads  and  temperatures 
than  those to be  encountered  in  service.  The  exact  loads  and  temperatures  must  be set 
high  enough to remove  those  incipient  failures  which would occur  under  normal  loads 
and temperatures. Conditions which produce a continually increasing failure rate 
should  be  examined as  a possible  indication of too severe a screen. 
When determining  the  types of screening  needed,  it  is  advisable to obtain  infor- 
mation  on  the  particular  part in question in order  to compare  its  normal  capabilities 
to the  specific  requirements of the intended application. It may be that recent correc- 
tive  actions  have  eliminated or  drastically  reduced  the  frequency of a particular con- 
dition  of  failure  that  occurred  in  the  past.  It is also  possible  that new device  designs 
may  require new screening  techniques  for  some  previously  unobserved failure 
mechanism. 
Screens  that  require  inspection  to  closer  tolerances,  or  testing  that is performed 
to more  res t r ic t ive  l imits   or   e lectr ical   parameters  have no physical affect on  the 
microcircuits  that are thus  processed.  Other  screens  which  subject  parts to 
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environmental o r  electrical stress, are intended to damage o r  degrade  borderline 
microcircuits,  thereby  causing  them  to be rejected  by later inspections o r   t e s t s .  It 
is vitally  important  that later inspections o r  tests have the capability of detecting  the 
damage o r  degradation  caused by additional stress, or   the  purpose of stressing  will  
have  been  defeated. 
Screening  techniques  can be divided into three  general   categories:   visual,  
electrical,  and  environmental  processing. 
B. VISUAL SCREENING 
A l l  manufacturers of monolithic  microcircuits  perform  visual  screens  in  their 
production  processing.  Visual  screens are  performed by production-line  operators, 
who accept   or   re ject   their  own work  on  criteria of quality  and  workmanship. 
Additionally,  visual  inspection  stations are strategically  placed  throughout  the 
manufacturing  process.  The  rejection  criteria  for  each  visual  screening  operation 
must be defined as exactly as possible.  The  inspector  must know exactly which 
characterist ics are undesirable.  Rejection  criteria  that are not defined adequately can 
result  in  either of two extremes: 
The  inspector,  not knowing what to reject, will reject everything 
that is doubtful. This  inspection  will  cause  rejection of many good 
parts,  and  production  costs  will  soar. 
0 The  inspector,  not knowing  what  o reject, will pass doubtful 
devices  which  could  cause  inherent  reliability  problems in use. 
It is extremely  important  that  the  rejection  criteria  for  visual  screening be 
based  on  sound  practical  reasoning.  Reject  analysis  and  failure  analysis  must be 
relied upon to provide the foundation for  rejection  cri teria,   Arbitrary  decisions  to 
re ject   or   accept  are  catastrophic.  The  temptation  is too grea t  to reject  those  devices 
which "do not look  just  right"  but  which  cannot  be  correlated to mechanisms of 
failure. 
Visual  screens are very  effective  for  removing  some  failure  mechanisms  and 
relatively  ineffective  for  removal of other  mechanisms. An example of the visual 
screen  effectivity lies in  the area of bond strength.  Improper bond placement  causes 
weak  bonds  because of the  reduced  alloy area beneath  the  misplaced bond. This 
mechanism of failure  lends  itself  well  to  visual  screening  techniques.  Bonds  may  also 
be  weakened by the  use of improper  temperature.   Improper bond temperatures  usually 
leave no visual  evidence of a weakened  bond; therefore ,   v isual   screens are  ineffective 
against them. From the aforementioned example, it may be readily seen that visual 
screens  can  have  an  important  impact upon certain  defect areas but  cannot  be  expected 
to  be  completely  effective  in  removing all defectives  from a defect  group. 
Visual  screens  include  the  use of microscopes  with  magnifying  power of suf- 
ficient proportion to properly evaluate the area to be inspected. Experience has 
shown that  diffusion,  oxide  removal,  and  masking  operations  require  magnification 
powers of lOOX to 400X. Metallization--and-d>inspection_S__a.re satisfactorily-.per.T.--.,_ 
formed  at  -hamount  and  header  inspections  require  only 7X to 40X 
magnification  factors.  Direct  collimated "_ light -_ sources  . are required. fordieand. 
,metalli.zztios-in,ssec-tion? Header  inspections are more  satisfactorily  performed  with 
incident o r  oblique  light  sources. 
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Radiographic examination is also  performed as a visual inspection. A complete 
microcircuit  may  be  photographed  with  the  aid of X-ray  equipment,  and  the  negatives 
may  be  examined  for  presence of extraneous  matter,  improper  mount,  pigtails,  etc. 
Manufacturers of monolithic  microcircuits  have  visual  inspection  criteria  which 
are applicable  to  each  particular  process o r  design.  The  buyer of microcircuits 
should  communicate  his  requirements  to  the  manufacturer. If visual  screens are 
desired  which are not a par t  of the  manufacturer's  normal  processing,  both  parties 
should  discuss  the  various  aspects of the  proposed  additional  screening.  The  discus- 
sion  should  enable  the  buyer  to  determine  whether  the  additional  screening  cost is 
warranted  in  terms of reliability  performance. 
C, ELECTRICAL SCREENING 
Electrical   screens are performed  aevarious  intervals  in  the  manufacturing 
processing of monolithic  microcircuits.  Some of the  screens  merely  determine  that  
the  particular  manufacturing  process  has  been  satisfactorily  performed. An example 
of this is the  resistivity  measurement of sl ices,   to  determine  that   the  proper  start ing 
material  has  been  used.  Electrical  screens of this  type  are  used  more  to  control 
processes  than  to  separate good devices  from  bad. 
The multiprobe (silicon slice electrical probe) and final test electrical screens 
a r e  designed  to  select  microcircuits  for  further  processing  to  ensure  that  the  devices 
meet specified electrical requirements. Special electrical tests (called parameters) 
guarantee  the  functional  capabilities of those  microcircuits  that  meet  the  test  require- 
ments.  The  loading  requirements  that  are  imposed upon the  microcircuits  during 
these tests insure  that  each of the  microcircuits  can  drive or can  be  driven by the 
proper  number of other  microcircuits.  Also, at the  final  acceptance  screen  test  the 
microcircuits  are  tested  at  different  temperatures  to  insure  that  the  devices  will 
operate  successfully  in  a  specified  temperature  operating  range. 
The  aforementioned  tests  guarantee  that  the  microcircuit(s) in question  meets 
a  specific  electrical  requirement  when  shipped  to  the  user. 
Other  electrical   screens are designed  to  ensure  that a microcircuit  will  operate 
in  a  given  configuration  over  extended  periods  of  time. One of the  most  widely  used 
screens of this type is the burn-in screen. During burn-in, the microcircuit is 
normally  biased  in a use-condition  configuration  at  maximum  voltage  levels.  The 
maximum guaranteed temperature condition is imposed upon each  microcircuit.  Data 
that  has  been  accumulated  on  burned-in  microcircuits  has  revealed  that  elevated 
temperatures  provide a means by which  failure  occurrence  can  be  accelerated.  The 
acceleration  factors  can  be  used to predict  with good accuracy  the  expected  failure 
rate  for  any  given  period of operating  time  at a given  temperature.  Burn-in  data  has 
also  revealed  that  the  reliability  failure  rate  for  microcircuits  improves  with  operat- 
ing  time.  This  means  that  the  failure  rate  for  any  given  group of microcircuits will  
be  improved by burn-in  screen,  and  it  attests to the  effectivness of burn-in as a 
suitable  screen  for  removing  potential  failures.  Additional  discussion of burn-in 
screens is contained  in  Volume 4 of this Handbook. 
The  monitored  vibration  test is another  additional  electrical  screen  that  may  be 
used  to  remove  mechanically  weak o r  potentially  intermittent  devices.  The  device is 
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operated  for a period of time and  simultaneously  subjected  to a mechanical  vibration. 
However,  losses  on  monitored  vibrations are typically  below 0. 2 percent;  this indi- 
cates that it is a relatively  inefficient.  screening  method. 
Electrical  screens  also  have  the  capability of detecting  degradation of a micro- 
circuit's  capabilities.  Often,  variables  data are obtained  prior  to  and  after  an elec- 
trical   or  environmental   screen.  Thus,   microcircuits  that   exhibit   excessive  drift   or 
degradation may be screened from the stable microcircuits. Actual data that have 
been  generated  on  many  devices in a major  military  program  indicate  that  this 
addition of variable  data is a refinement  that  does not improve  the  burn-in  efficiency 
considerably. The reason is that (as opposed to discrete failure history) only a small  
percent of the  failures  have  pre-indicators of device  parameter  degradation.  The  vast 
majority fail without previous degradation indication. Consequently, before arbitrarily 
using  this  refinement,  system  requirements  should  be  considered. 
D. ENVIRONMENTAL SCREENING 
1. General 
A large  number of environmental  screens  that are similar  to  many of the 
screens  described  in MIL-STD-750 have  been  sufficiently  evaluated as screening  tools 
to determine their effectivity. Most environmental screens are used to determine 
whether a microcircuit  has  the  mechanical  strength to withstand  the  environmental 
conditions of expected  usage. Al l  too often  the  buyer of monolithic  microcircuits  will 
"overbuy" with respect to environmental screens. For example, if the buyer expects 
to  use  his  microcircuits in a large fixed  computer  which  is  housed  in a controlled 
environment, why should  he buy processing  that  includes 20 ,000  g levels of constant 
acceleration, and extreme temperature cycling? Conversely, some users of mono- 
lithic  microcircuits  have  extreme  environmental  requirements,  and  therefore,  need 
the  added  guarantee of the  environmental  screen  techniques;  however,  they do not 
buy these  screens.  
Some  environmental  screens  that  have  proven  merit are discussed 
briefly  hereafter. 
2. Temperature  Cycling 
The  specifications  that  control  temperature  cycling are  many  and  varied. 
Generally,  the  purpose of temperature  cycling  is  to  determine  that a device  can  with- 
stand  drastic  temperature  changes  over  an  extended  period of time  without  failure o r  
degradation. The temperature cycle screen is effective in determining that thermal 
mismatch between materials is not sufficiently great to cause problems. Tempera- 
ture  cycling  also  has  been  effective  for  determining  metallization  faults. A typical 
temperature  cycling  screen  will  commonly  specify 1 0  to  15  cycles  from -55" C to 
+125" C,  with  thirty  minutes of dwell  time  at  each  extreme.  The  ambient  condition 
is generally  air-to-air. 
3. Thermal Shock 
The  thermal  shock  screen is merely  an  accelerated  version of temperature 
cycling. Again, the purpose is to insure that drastic temperature changes will not 
affect  microcircuit  operation  over  an  extended  period of time. A typical  thermal  shock 
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will  require 5 to  10  cycles  from 0°C to +lOO"C, with 5 minutes of dwell at each 
temperature  extreme.  The  heat  exchange  environment is usually liquid-to-liquid to 
insure  extremely fast temperature  excursions. 
4. Mechanical  Shock 
The  mechanical  shock  screen is designed  to  insure  that a microcircuit is 
not sensitive to extreme  mechanical  violence,  It is effective in determining that 
weak mechanical bonds to die  and  package  do  not  exist.  A  typical  mechanical  shock 
will  specify  1500  gravity  forces to 6 , 000 gravity  forces at 5 to 1 0  repetitions  in 
each of the 3 mechanical  planes.  The  kinetic  energy  dispelled  in  the  drop  test,  and 
the time duration of the  shock  value  determine  the  gravity  force  level. Although a 
strong  argument  can be made  for  electrically  monitoring  the  device's  operation  for 
evidence of noise  or  intermittency,  fixturing  problems  and  very  high  cost  usually 
preclude  this  possibility. 
5. Constant  Acceleration 
The  constant  acceleration screen is sometimes  called  centrifuge  screen- 
ing. The  purpose of this  screen is to  insure  that  the  mechanical  integrity of the 
microcircuit is sufficient to withstand extremely-high-gravity force levels. Constant 
acceleration  levels of 1 0 , 0 0 0  gravity  forces to 100 ,000  gravity  forces  are  used to 
assure  the  buyer  that  he  will  receive  quality  devices. 
To apply this  screen,  the  devices are placed  into a centrifuge  machine  and 
accelerated to the  proper  gravity  level,  which is determined by the  radius of the 
centrifuge wheel and the acceleration factor. All  three mechanical planes are usually 
investigated in reliability  tests  but are limited  to a single  plane  in  screen  tests-the 
plane which tends to pull the bond away from  the  die.  Three  common  mechanisms of 
failure  uncovered by the  constant  acceleration  screen are: 
0 Poor mechanical bond of die  to  package. 
0 Poor mechanical bond of lead w i r e  to die o r  package. 
0 Excessively  long  lead  wires  that could short together, to the 
d i e ,   o r  to the package. 
6. Vibration Variable Frequency 
The  vibration  variable  frequency  screen is used to determine  that  the 
microcircuit is not sensitive to any reasonable frequency of vibration. The theory is 
to determine  that  the  microcircuit  is free to resonant  frequencies  that  might  cause 
degradation  or  failure-such as cracks  in the  die,   or  shattering of the  mounting 
material, etc. Typical vibration variable frequency screens use 2 to 20 gravity 
forces  with  frequencies of 20 to 2 , 0 0 0  cycles  per second:  this is roughly  the  limita- 
tion of available equipment. The small size of microcircuits  usually  dictates  that 
mechanical resonances will occur at higher  frequencies.  Therefore,  this  screen  is of 
limited  value. 
7. Vibration  Fatigue 
The  vibration  fatigue screen is used  to  insure  that  the  microcircuit is 
capable of withstanding extended periods of vibration without damaging effects. A 
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typical  vibration  fatigue  screen  consists of 2 to 1 0  gravity  force  levels at  60 cycles  per 
second  for  approximately 100 hours. A microcircuit  that  has  successfully  passed  this 
screen is considered  to  be free of vibration  sensitive  mechanisms of failure.  The 
length of time  required  and  difficulties  in  preparing  and  maintaining  the  equipment 
during  the test make  this  extremely  cost  prohibitive as a 100 percent  screen. 
8. Destructive  Screens 
In addition  to  the  previously  mentioned  environmental  screens,  other  tests 
that  have  been  developed  destroy  the  microcircuit a s  a useful  part.  These  destructive 
tests  cannot  be  used  in 100 percent  processing of monolithic  microcircuits.  Statistical 
sampling of lots   or   groups of microcircuits  can  give a high  degree of confidence  that 
the lots o r  groups of microcircuits  are  capable of withstanding  these  environments. 
Some  destructive  tests  that  are  conducted  on a sample  basis are included  in  the 
following  list: 
0 Moisture  resistance 
0 Solderability 
e Lead  fatigue 
0 Salt  atmosphere 
0 Impressed  voltage  at  elevated  temperature  and  high  humidity. 
9. Storage o r  Shelf  Life  Screen 
The  storage o r  shelf  life  screen  may  be  designed to he a nondestructive 
test. It is generally  agreed  that 1 , 0 0 0  hours of storage  life  at  design  temperature is 
not detrimental to a microcircuit 's  designed  capabilities. It is also  generally  agreed 
that 1 , 0 0 0  hours of storage life a t  350" C decreases  significantly a microcircuit 's 
expected  life.  The  specific  requirement of shelf  life  must  be  the  determining  factor 
of whether shelf life (storage life) is considered a destructive  test.  The  storage  life 
test is commonly  used  as a tool  to  determine the microcircuit 's  reliability  failure 
rate,  due  to  the  fact  that  extensive  studies  have  revealed  that  increased  temperature 
causes  accelerated  life  failures. 
The  user of monolithic  microcircuits  must  carefully  examine  his  intended 
usage to determine if the  added  cost of environmental  screening is warranted. 
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SECTION V 
CORRECTIVE  ACTION 
A. GENERAL 
A process  change  that  is  implemented  to  reduce  the  occurrence of a failure 
mechanism is known as a corrective  action. A corrective  action  may be as simple 
as to  change  the  etch  time  required  for  metallization  removal, o r  it may  be so 
complex as to  entail  the  complete  redesign of the  circuit.  The  specific  corrective 
action  required is determined by the  mechanism of failure to be corrected. 
That  corrective  action is required  necessarily  means  that a problem  has  been 
observed  that is not desirable.  The  need  for  corrective  action is usually  realized 
only after a sufficient  quantity of failures  have  occurred  to  create a concern,  and 
analysis of the  failures  has  identified a common  mechanism of failure.  The  fact  that 
a common  medhanism of failure  has  occurred is not  enough  to  allow  corrective  action 
to  be  implemented.  The  mechanism of failure  must  be  thoroughly  understood so that 
the  corrective  action  can  be  based upon  sound engineering  principles. 
Once the  mechanism of failure is understood  and  an  engineered  approach to 
corrective  action  has  been  resolved,  the  corrective  action  must  be  evaluated  for 
effectiveness of its intended purpose. Even more important, it must be established 
that  the  corrective  action  does  not  introduce a new mechanism of failure  that  may  be 
even  more  serious  than  the  existant  problem. 
The  corrective  action  may  be  considered  adequate when it  has  met the  following 
criteria:  
0 The mechanism of failure that made necessary the corrective action 
has  been  significantly  reduced or   e l iminated.  
a The corrective action has not introduced new mechanisms of failure 
that  will  create a significant  problem  in  the  future. 
0 The corrective action was properly engineered to include the best 
available  state-of-the-art  technology. 
When microcircuits are continuously  procurred  during a program,  experience 
gained at   the beginning of the  program  results  in  corrective  action. An increasing 
improvement  in  reliability  can be expected as the  later  microcircuits are delivered. 
This  procedure  can  often  be  the basis of the  ultimate  success of a reliability  program. 
B. UTILIZATION O F  FAILURE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
The  purpose of failure  analysis  is  to  obtain  results  that  can be used  to  reduce o r  
to eliminate  device  failures.  The  absence of failures  in  any  microcircuit  application 
is a much  dreamed of but  seldom  realized  occurrence.  As  the  state of the art in 
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semiconductor  technology  has  progressed,  the  reliability  failure rate of monolithic 
microcircuits has been  reduced  drastically.  It  has  become  increasingly  difficult  to 
prove how good microcircuits  really are. Hundreds of millions of operating  hours 
must  be accomplished to prove  the  reliability  failure rate. By the  time  the  failure 
rate has  been  proved,  the  information  has  been  obsoleted by  technological  advance- 
ments. 
A concept of corrective  action  has  evolved  from  the  theory  that a reduction  in 
the  occurrence of failure  mechanisms  will  reduce  the  failure  rate,  regardless of i ts  
absolute value. This concept of corrective  action is entirely  dependent upon the 
ability  to  determine  mechanisms of failure,  and  it  has  resulted  in  the  advent of 
sophisticated failure analysis laboratories throughout the industry. The purpose of 
these  laboratories is to analyze  failures,  identify  the  mechanism of failures,  and  to 
understand  the  physics of failure  which  induce  these  mechanisms.  A  corrective  action 
cycle  consists of the  following  steps: 
0 Generate  failures  that are related  to  use  condition. 
0 Analyze  the  generated  failures. 
0 Study the  results of analysis. 
0 Implement  corrective  action. 
0 Determine results of corrective action from analysis of failures 
generated. 
It  appears  that few users   or   manufacturers  of monolithic  microcircuits  have 
difficulty  generating  failures.  The  ability  to  analyze  the f ailures  generated  has  been 
more difficult to accomplish. However, great strides have been made in this area of 
endeavor, with improved equipment and sophisticated analysis techniques. The first 
breakdown  in  the  corrective  action  cycle  occurs  when  the  information  gained  from 
failure analysis is not used properly. For this reason, each failure analysis activity 
must  have a group of people  whose  sole  responsibility is to  complete  the  link in the 
cycle  between  analysis  and  corrective  action  implementation.  This  group must per- 
form a liaison  function  between  the  failure  analysis  laboratory  and  the  individuals 
responsible  for  application of the  corrective  action. 
In summary,  i t  serves no useful  purpose to perform  failure  analyses  and  to 
understand  mechanisms of failure  unless  the  information is used to improve  product 
quality.  Therefore, it is of prime  importance  that a program  be  instituted in con- 
junction  with  each  failure  analysis  activity,  that  will  enable  the  organization  to  fully 
use  the  failure  results  thus  obtained. 
C. RETRIEVAL OF FAILURE INFORMATION 
The  retrieval of failure  information is much  more  widely  accepted  and  practiced 
by manufacturers  than by use r s  of microcircuits.  Most  manufacturers of monolithic 
microcircuits  have  realized  the  importance of failure  analysis  and  corrective  action. 
These  manufacturers  have  implemented  corrective  action  cycles  into  their  processes. 
Some of these  manufacturers  have  also  instituted  sophisticated  information  retrieval 
programs  that  use  data  processing  programs  to  determine  significant  problem  areas. 
Problems  observed  "in  house"  have  been  quickly  and  satisfactorily  solved. 
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The  source of failure  and  reliability  information  that  has  remained  relatively 
unexqdored is the  user. Users of monolithic  microcircuits  have  untold  quantities of 
performance  data  and  failure  information  that  could  benefit  both  the  user  and  manufac- 
tu rer  of microcircuits.  This is especially  true  because  the  rapid  technological  ad- 
vancements  that are occurring  in  solid state circuits  preclude a proper  evaluation of 
par ts   pr ior  to their  use.  The  users of microcircuits  cannot  wait  one o r  two years   for  
par ts  to be evaluated  and  proven.  Because of this,  parts  must  be  proven  in the  field 
where  they are used. 
The  routing of failure  and  reliability  information  from  the  user to the  manufac- 
t u re r  of microcircuits  on a prompt  and  continuing  basis  could  decrease  the  time 
required  to  reach a failure  goal, by months o r  even  years.  Information  retrieval  and 
transfer  between  users  and  manufacturers  should  be  an  integral  part of every  purchase 
contract  for  large  quantities of monolithic  microcircuits, 
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